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Rudolf Wittkower, Architectural Principles in the Age of Humanism (New York: Nor- ton, 1971), 29 and 101: The conviction that architecture is a science . . . may be called the basic axiom of Renaissance architects, and Blunt s Artistic Theory in Italy: 1450 1600, especially chap. 1, Alberti, 1 22. 41. Erwin Panofsky, The Life and Art of Albrecht Dürer (Princeton: Princeton Uni- versity Press, 1955), 260 61. 42. Procacinni, Alberti and the Framing of Perspective, 37. 43. See Jurgis Baltrusaitis, Anamorphic Art, trans. W. J. Strachen (New York: H. N. Abrams, 1977). 44. Panofsky, Perspective as Symbolic Form, 18. 45. See Plato, Theaetetus, passim, especially 157ff, and Aristotle, Metaphysics, 1009a ff. 46. See On Painting, 55, where Alberti mentions Protagoras in the context of his assertion that all things are known by comparison, the effect of which was to deny the necessity of an absolute measure and invest man s unaided reason with the power to discern truth, and De Beryllo, where Cusa questions Aristotle s criti- cism of Protagoras dictum that man is the measure of all things : aristoteles dicit prothagoram in hoc nihil profundi dixisse, mihi tamen magna valde dixisse videtur. NOTES TO PAGES 193 194 205 Nikolaus von Kues, Werke, ed. Paul Wilpert (Berlin: Walter De Gruyter, 1967), 2:734. See also Nicholas of Cusa on Learned Ignorance (De Docta Ignorantia), trans. Jasper Hopkins (Minneapolis: Banning, 1981), 50 51; and Hans Blumenberg, Die Genesis der kopernikanischen Welt (Frankfurt am Main: Suhrkamp, 1975), 564, and The Legitimacy of the Modern Age, 525ff. Unfortunately, this is a case where history has not cooperated with the dictates of historiography as fully as it might have. For, suggestive though the association of Protagoras with the Renaissance is, little sub- stantial influence can be documented. As Charles Trinkaus argues, interest in Pro- tagoras in the Renaissance was small or anecdotal. ( Protagoras in the Renaissance: An Exploration, in Philosophy and Humanism: Essays in Honor of Paul Oskar Kristeller, ed. Edward Mahoney [New York: Columbia University Press, 1976], 212.) Besides the texts cited above, Trinkaus turns up only a handful of rather offhand references. Still and this is the point of his article the conceptual parallel is so striking that he can write that even if there was no connection between [the Greek sophist movement, which Protagoras may be said to epitomize, and the Italian Renaissance], there ought to have been (190). It has been left to modernity to fulfill this ought and exploit the connection between Protagoras and the Renaissance fully. 47. On which see Karsten Harries, The Infinite Sphere: Comments on the His- tory of a Metaphor, Journal of the History of Philosophy 13 (January 1975): 5-15, especially 7. 48. Alexander Baumgarten, Reflections on Poetry, trans. K. Aschenbrenner and W. B. Holther (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1954), 68. 49. Ernst Cassirer, The Philosophy of the Enlightenment, trans. Fritz Koelin and James Pettegrove (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1979), 316; on Shaftes- bury, see also 84. 50. Ibid., 316. 51. Søren Kierkegaard, The Concept of Dread, trans. Walter Lowrie (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1970), 107ff. The demonic for Kierkegaard, dread of the good is freedom willing itself to be unfree by insisting on itself to the denial of its dependence on the good. See also Kierkegaard, The Despair of Willing Despairingly to be Oneself Defiance, in The Sickness Unto Death, trans. Walter Lowrie (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1970), 200 8. 52. John Milton, Paradise Lost, bk. 4, line 75. 53. Quoted in Milton C. Nahm, The Artist as Creator: An Essay of Human Freedom (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1956), 4. 54. On the relation between the artist s striving for autonomy and the demonic, see Hans Sedlmayr s provocative discussion in Art in Crisis: The Lost Center (New Brunswick: Transaction Publishers, 2006), especially 158ff. and 173ff. 55. Hugo Friedrich, The Structure of Modern Poetry, trans. Joachim Neugroschel (Evanston: Northwestern University Press, 1974), 129. 56. Ibid., 156; cf. 53. 206 NOTES TO PAGES 195 199 57. See Leszek Kolakowski s discussion in Religion (New York: Oxford University Press, 1982), 20ff. The theory, he writes, which made logical, mathematical, and moral laws dependent entirely on God s free and arbitrary decree was, historically speaking, an important step in getting rid of God altogether. . . . The nominalistic tendency to devolve responsibility for our logic and ethics on the Creator s arbitrary fiat marked the beginning of his separation from the universe. If there is no way in which the actual fiat can be understood in terms of God s essence, there is simply no way from creatures to God. Consequently, it doesn t matter much, in our think- ing and actions, whether He exists or not (23). See also Hans Blumenberg s The Legitimacy of the Modern Age, 150 79, and Die Genesis der kopernikanischen Welt, 555 66; and Alexander Koyré s From the Closed World to the Infinite Universe (Balti- more: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1974). 58. On this distinction between the ontological and aesthetic conception of beauty, and the predominance of the latter in the modern age, see Ernesto Grassi s Die Theorie des Schönen in der Antike (Koln: DuMont, 1962), and Karsten Harries, Hegel on the Future of Art, Review of Metaphysics 27.4 (June 1974): 677 96. A representative statement of the ontological conception is Hegel s claim that beauty is only a certain manner of expressing and representing the true ; the aesthetic con- ception, on the other hand, Harries writes, stresses the autonomy of the aesthetic sphere and denies any connection between beauty and truth (681). Following Heidegger, Harries shows how the typically modern conception of truth, heir to Descartes insistence on the clear and distinct, understands truth on the model of conceptual transparency and thus has to exclude art indeed, all that is marked by the sensible from the realm of truth. There is something about our epoch, he notes, which makes it difficult for us to take seriously art s claim to serve the truth, viz., our tendency to tie truth to transparency (684). 59. Charles Murray, Human Accomplishment: The Pursuit of Excellence in the Arts and Sciences 800 B.C. to 1950 (New York: HarperCollins, 2003), 455. 60. Ibid., 456. 61. Ibid., 457. 62. Immanuel Kant, What is Enlightenment? in The Philosophy of Kant, ed. Carl J. Friedrich (New York: Modern Library, 1949), 132. 63. David Jones, Religion and the Muses, in Epoch and Artist: Selected Writings, ed. Harman Grisewood (London: Faber and Faber, 1959), 103. 64. Ibid., 97. 65. Jones, Art and Sacrament, in Epoch and Artist, 143. 66. W. H. Auden, Christianity and Art, in The Dyer s Hand and Other Essays (New York: Random House, 1962), 458. 67. Murray, Human Accomplishment, 455. 68. T. S. Eliot, Arnold and Pater, in Selected Essays of T. S. Eliot (New York: Har- court, Brace & World, 1964), 392. 69. Sedlmayr, Art in Crisis, 218. NOTES TO PAGES 199 200 207 [ Pobierz caÅ‚ość w formacie PDF ] |