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indeed more or less suggest that this was the case (Cusumano 1985; Fujimoto 1999). Low levels of demand prevailed even before the war. The early car market in Japan was affected by small land space, bad road conditions, and low income levels , all of which increased demand for small cars rather than large ones (Shimokawa 1994, p. 226). Initially, 98 Institutions, Communication and Values however, Toyota, was not particularly responsive to these market condi- tions. In the 1930s Kiichiro Toyoda, driven by his ambition to compete head-on with US car makers, unlike Nissan opted for a 3000cc people s car which had to be large enough to cater to the US market instead of a small car (Wada and Yui 2002, pp. 239 41). His first prototype auto- mobile was based on American models (Odaka et al. 1988, p. 125; Wada and Yui 2002, p. 247) and only once car production was re-established after the war did Kiichiro define the production of a small car, of between 1000 and 1500cc, as an aim for his company (Toyota 1988, pp. 100 1). Ohno is emphatic that the post-war fragmented demand for many prod- uct varieties required JIT production (Ohno 1988, p. xiii). However, in the first years following the defeat of Japan, Japanese car makers mainly pro- duced trucks for civilian purposes and demand for private cars remained low. The Japanese government was subject to the authority of the US Supreme Commander of Allied Powers (SCAP) or General Headquarters (GHQ) between 1945 and 1952. In a continuation of wartime policy, scarce resources were to be directed to necessary goods, in particular toward the revitalization of heavy industry. GHQ moderated the ban on domestic production of passenger cars in June 1947 (raising allow- able production slightly to a maximum of 300 cars per year) and lifted the ban altogether only in October 1949. Moreover, Japanese car mak- ers were not protected against imports of US cars that were far superior in quality (Cusumano 1985, p. 7). Post-war demand was thus indeed initially low, but it was not particularly diverse. Toyota produced some 20,000 trucks and buses and a few hundred passenger cars between 1947 and 1949 (Toyota 1988, p. 461); overall, production consisted mainly of one type of truck for the depressed civilian market (Cusumano 1985, p. 266). Thus the combination of both low and fragmented demand to imprint Toyota s lean production between 1947 and 1949 did not exist, an argument reinforced by the fact that Toyota s first application of JIT by Kiichiro Toyoda was not to diverse vehicle production but was almost exclusively concerned with manufacturing standard military trucks. Availability of material and financial resources The same qualification applies to a frequent suggestion in the literature that an initial scarcity of material resources imprinted on the Toyota Production System. For instance, a group of Toyota officials has labelled the lack of natural resources as the most distinctive feature of Japan (Sugimori et al. 1977, p. 553) and claimed that this focused Japanese industries more closely than industries in other countries on minimiz- ing costs while still maintaining the production of high quality goods. Path Dependence, Initial Conditions and Routines 99 More specifically, Coriat (2000, p. 218) identifies the lack of raw mater- ials as a circumstance peculiar to the early post-war years, stimulating Japanese companies to search for material-saving working methods. In fact, scarcity of raw materials plagued the Japanese economy, including Toyota (Toyota 1988, pp. 75 6 and 99 100), from 1941, when the allied forces blocked shipments to Japan, through the initial post-war years when the victors put the Japanese economy on short rations (Cohen 1949). Nonetheless, the literature does not contain any references to specific empirical data indicating that scarcity of raw materials actually stimulated or even necessitated the (re)introduction of JIT production at Toyota in the first post-war years. Around 1948, when Ohno was begin- ning his experiments, Toyota often had to wait for parts from its suppliers until the middle of the month, forcing it to realize its planned monthly production in just two weeks (Cusumano 1985, p. 278). Shortage of mat- erials thus prevented JIT-production, as Kiichiro Toyoda had experienced in 1939. Cusumano (1985, p. 264) offers a more plausible version of an explanation in terms of material resources: The Japanese, reacting originally to shortages of space and low production volume, developed the practice of consolidating various shops under one roof rather than building separate facilities for casting, body stamping, final assembly, or other distinct operations (italics added). Still, consolidation does not necessary imply JIT production. A lean production system character- ized by multi-purpose equipment, low intermediate inventories and a minimum of warehouse space, makes at least as much sense from a per- spective of limiting investments as of minimizing the use of materials. More relevant therefore were perhaps the limited financial means avail- able to Toyota that like Nissan had great difficulty during this period in remaining in business (Fujimoto 1999; Cusumano 1985). Availability of labour resources Characteristically, Ohno himself stressed the importance of JIT for the identification and avoidance of waste in the shape of idle labour rather than of raw materials (Ohno 1988, p. 13; Shingo 1989; Williams et al. 1994). This despite the abundance of labour in the first post-war years, when production for the military had stopped and many skilled workers were on the labour market (Gordon 1985, pp. 334 and 346). It should be noted that, on the other hand, the auto workers position was strength- ened considerably by the democratization policy of GHQ in the first post-war years. Japanese union membership grew from negligible roots to more than 6.5 million in June 1948 (Okayama 1987, p. 171) and an industry-wide car workers union was formed in 1947. In the same 100 Institutions, Communication and Values year, Ohno introduced the practice of workers handling more than one machine each in the so-called L-layout in Toyota s machine-shop (Ohno 1988, p. 11). Multi-machine handling, a prime example of what was later denoted by the company as autonomation ( automation with a human face ), became a central element in Toyota s lean production system. To save labour, Toyota increasingly used multi-functional work- ers, restructuring jobs so that operations became more versatile, but also demanded less skill than before. The craft element of production that had prevailed in Japanese car production until then was abandoned (Daito 2000, pp. 147 9; Okayama 1987, pp. 178 9; Fujimoto, 1999, p. 64). Toyota s first post-war application of lean production thus owed more to a strategic decision to reduce dependence on skilled labour than to any imprinting by the external condition of scarcity in material resources. 8.5 Meta-routines as selection mechanism The common focus on specific external economic initial conditions as the main imprinting factor on the emergence of lean production at Toyota does not pass the empirical test. The adoption of JIT has also been related, however, to an economy-wide wartime passion for avoiding the [ Pobierz całość w formacie PDF ] |