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Col. Francis X. Kane, Ph.D. (USAF Ret.)
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© 1997 Jerry E. Pournelle
Chapter Two
An Overview Of The Recent History of the Technological War
[Table of Contents]
We have called the Technological War the decisive war, and have stated that
the United States has not always done well in its conduct of that war. The
reasons for our repeated failure in
technological warfare -- despite the fact that we are far and away the most
advanced technological power and have expended far more money, manpower, time
and resources on military technology than all other nations combined --
require careful study. There is no reason
why the United States cannot maintain a decisive advantage in the
Technological War, and, moreover, do so with the expenditure of no more
resources than are now being used up in our present wasteful efforts.
(Footnote 1)
.
In our national strategy far too much attention has been paid to current
affairs and specific conflict situations. Instead of a real technological
strategy we have a series of unrelated decisions
on specific problems. There have been attempts to integrate the individual
decisions, but these
attempts have often resulted in even more waste and inefficiency. Examples
abound. Consider,
for example, the fanciful expectations about the TFX (FB-111), the joint
service fighter aircraft program; and the Sergeant York missile, which,
originally a reasonable idea, was micromismanaged, given impossible goals to
meet, and eventually cancelled.
The fact is, we had no mechanism for generating a strategy of technology. The
Joint Chiefs of
Staff have been an inter-service negotiating board; and since the officers who
serve the Joint
Chiefs must depend on boards of officers drawn from their own branch of
service for promotion, there has been little chance that anyone will or can
develop loyalty to the Joint Chiefs as an institution.
In the late 1980's, the situation began to change. Under the urging of the
Reagan Administration,
the Commanders in Chief (CINC's) of the major operating forces -- SAC,
EURCOM, PACOM, SOUTHCOM, SOFCOM, and SPACECOM -- were given responsibility for
generating requirements and for both advocating and defending programs. The
struggle within the Joint
Chiefs thus became one of struggle among the CINC's for resources with the
JCS, and especially the Vice Chairman, being the adjustors. The Services
started to become responsible solely for
personnel, R&D, logistics, and budget, and their role within operations began
to disappear.
However, there is no technological CINC, and no clear career path for the
developing technological strategist within any branch of service.
Organization of This Chapter
[Table of Contents]
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In the pages below we open with an overview of Soviet technological strategy
as it contrasts with ours. We will then give examples of U.S. successes and
failures in four periods:
1950's: ICBM and the nuclear powered airplane
1960's: SSBM, Apollo, space technology and satellites, and TFX
1970's: MIRV, new fighters, and the Shuttle
1980's: B-1; SDI; cruise missiles; MX, and C3/I; B2
We follow with more examples of Soviet achievements during the same time
periods:
1950's: H-bomb; ICBM/IRBM, Space boosters
1960's: Nuclear powered submarines, advanced fighters, tanks
1970's: Manned space program; MIRV
1980's: Mobile ICBM
We will then examine the lessons learned from these examples.
Soviet Technological Strategy
[Table of Contents]
Although the Soviet Union begins from a lower technological and industrial
base, some of their achievements in the Technological War have been
impressive.
In contrast to the diffusion of effort, centralization of decision making, and
micromanagement which characterize American technological strategy, the
Soviets have a strategy of focusing their efforts, including basic and applied
research. Central direction and control are key aspects of
their use of technology. This means that discovery must be on schedule. The
motivation of
Soviet scientists has been an important factor in meeting goals, but sanctions
and punishment are also an important part of the Soviet system. By focusing
their efforts the Soviets allow to atrophy
those areas which they do not consider important to their strategy.
The Soviet priority system places military technology and fundamental industry
a long way ahead of any other aspects of technology. In part this neglect of
other technology is then
compensated for by purchase of non-strategic goods and technical processes
from the West;
scientific exchange programs; industrial espionage and piracy; and general
exploitation of
Western achievements.
Arms negotiations to slow down the U.S. technological challenge by eliminating
key weapons and technologies have always been a key part of the Soviet
strategy of technology. The INF is a
prime example of this. The Soviets naturally seek to negotiate the elimination
of technologies in
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which they are weak, and to retain those where they are strong.
The INF treaty is a prime example. Under INF an entire class of weapons --
nuclear and non-
nuclear -- was eliminated. Not only were the nuclear tipped IRBM's destroyed,
but the non-
nuclear systems, while not destroyed, cannot be improved by new technologies.
The result was
to increase, not decrease, the strategic imbalance in Europe, because the
U.S.S.R. has no great need of IRBM systems, while the U.S. and NATO do not
have a good substitute.
The Soviet commanders of the Technological War can afford to wait for consumer
technology and goods, and concentrate their efforts on winning the decisive
war. This remains true during
the era of glasnost; although there is an emphasis on decentralization of the
civilian technology and the production of consumer goods, there has been
little noticeable decrease in military spending; this remains true in late
1989, even after the fall of the Berlin Wall. Given that there
will be cuts in the overall Soviet military budget, it is highly likely that
there will be little to no decrease in military R&D.
The Soviets concentrate their technical and engineering talent on the decision
and design phases of technology for those systems which are most important to
their strategic goals
(Footnote 2)
.
This permits them to weigh the relative merits of alternative technical
approaches to their strategic goals and use what they have learned from
Western technology to aid the production process. Their strategy facilitates
finding a near-optimum approach to a variety of goals, and is
designed to compensate for their inferiority in overall technical resources.
The point is, despite
the enormous Western superiority in total quantity of technological resources,
the U.S.S.R. has been able to concentrate more effort than we have on selected
portions of weapons technology and to gain superiority in many phases of
military technology driven by strategy.
In their designs the Soviets make simplicity an important criterion for both
production and operation. Success in achieving simplicity leads to low costs
of production and, importantly, to
high reliability of operation. Simplicity also allows them to operate the
systems with personnel
who have only rudimentary training and skills, and to reserve their limited
supply of highly skilled technicians for research and development.
Because their deadlines are self-imposed, the Soviets can take their time
about selecting designs.
This was the pattern they followed in military computer technology. After
making a survey of
Western advances on a variety of fronts, they chose an optimum path to follow. [ Pobierz całość w formacie PDF ]
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