[ Pobierz całość w formacie PDF ]
Col. Francis X. Kane, Ph.D. (USAF Ret.) Page 24 ABC Amber Palm Converter, http://www.processtext.com/abcpalm.html © 1997 Jerry E. Pournelle Chapter Two An Overview Of The Recent History of the Technological War [Table of Contents] We have called the Technological War the decisive war, and have stated that the United States has not always done well in its conduct of that war. The reasons for our repeated failure in technological warfare -- despite the fact that we are far and away the most advanced technological power and have expended far more money, manpower, time and resources on military technology than all other nations combined -- require careful study. There is no reason why the United States cannot maintain a decisive advantage in the Technological War, and, moreover, do so with the expenditure of no more resources than are now being used up in our present wasteful efforts. (Footnote 1) . In our national strategy far too much attention has been paid to current affairs and specific conflict situations. Instead of a real technological strategy we have a series of unrelated decisions on specific problems. There have been attempts to integrate the individual decisions, but these attempts have often resulted in even more waste and inefficiency. Examples abound. Consider, for example, the fanciful expectations about the TFX (FB-111), the joint service fighter aircraft program; and the Sergeant York missile, which, originally a reasonable idea, was micromismanaged, given impossible goals to meet, and eventually cancelled. The fact is, we had no mechanism for generating a strategy of technology. The Joint Chiefs of Staff have been an inter-service negotiating board; and since the officers who serve the Joint Chiefs must depend on boards of officers drawn from their own branch of service for promotion, there has been little chance that anyone will or can develop loyalty to the Joint Chiefs as an institution. In the late 1980's, the situation began to change. Under the urging of the Reagan Administration, the Commanders in Chief (CINC's) of the major operating forces -- SAC, EURCOM, PACOM, SOUTHCOM, SOFCOM, and SPACECOM -- were given responsibility for generating requirements and for both advocating and defending programs. The struggle within the Joint Chiefs thus became one of struggle among the CINC's for resources with the JCS, and especially the Vice Chairman, being the adjustors. The Services started to become responsible solely for personnel, R&D, logistics, and budget, and their role within operations began to disappear. However, there is no technological CINC, and no clear career path for the developing technological strategist within any branch of service. Organization of This Chapter [Table of Contents] Page 25 ABC Amber Palm Converter, http://www.processtext.com/abcpalm.html In the pages below we open with an overview of Soviet technological strategy as it contrasts with ours. We will then give examples of U.S. successes and failures in four periods: 1950's: ICBM and the nuclear powered airplane 1960's: SSBM, Apollo, space technology and satellites, and TFX 1970's: MIRV, new fighters, and the Shuttle 1980's: B-1; SDI; cruise missiles; MX, and C3/I; B2 We follow with more examples of Soviet achievements during the same time periods: 1950's: H-bomb; ICBM/IRBM, Space boosters 1960's: Nuclear powered submarines, advanced fighters, tanks 1970's: Manned space program; MIRV 1980's: Mobile ICBM We will then examine the lessons learned from these examples. Soviet Technological Strategy [Table of Contents] Although the Soviet Union begins from a lower technological and industrial base, some of their achievements in the Technological War have been impressive. In contrast to the diffusion of effort, centralization of decision making, and micromanagement which characterize American technological strategy, the Soviets have a strategy of focusing their efforts, including basic and applied research. Central direction and control are key aspects of their use of technology. This means that discovery must be on schedule. The motivation of Soviet scientists has been an important factor in meeting goals, but sanctions and punishment are also an important part of the Soviet system. By focusing their efforts the Soviets allow to atrophy those areas which they do not consider important to their strategy. The Soviet priority system places military technology and fundamental industry a long way ahead of any other aspects of technology. In part this neglect of other technology is then compensated for by purchase of non-strategic goods and technical processes from the West; scientific exchange programs; industrial espionage and piracy; and general exploitation of Western achievements. Arms negotiations to slow down the U.S. technological challenge by eliminating key weapons and technologies have always been a key part of the Soviet strategy of technology. The INF is a prime example of this. The Soviets naturally seek to negotiate the elimination of technologies in Page 26 ABC Amber Palm Converter, http://www.processtext.com/abcpalm.html which they are weak, and to retain those where they are strong. The INF treaty is a prime example. Under INF an entire class of weapons -- nuclear and non- nuclear -- was eliminated. Not only were the nuclear tipped IRBM's destroyed, but the non- nuclear systems, while not destroyed, cannot be improved by new technologies. The result was to increase, not decrease, the strategic imbalance in Europe, because the U.S.S.R. has no great need of IRBM systems, while the U.S. and NATO do not have a good substitute. The Soviet commanders of the Technological War can afford to wait for consumer technology and goods, and concentrate their efforts on winning the decisive war. This remains true during the era of glasnost; although there is an emphasis on decentralization of the civilian technology and the production of consumer goods, there has been little noticeable decrease in military spending; this remains true in late 1989, even after the fall of the Berlin Wall. Given that there will be cuts in the overall Soviet military budget, it is highly likely that there will be little to no decrease in military R&D. The Soviets concentrate their technical and engineering talent on the decision and design phases of technology for those systems which are most important to their strategic goals (Footnote 2) . This permits them to weigh the relative merits of alternative technical approaches to their strategic goals and use what they have learned from Western technology to aid the production process. Their strategy facilitates finding a near-optimum approach to a variety of goals, and is designed to compensate for their inferiority in overall technical resources. The point is, despite the enormous Western superiority in total quantity of technological resources, the U.S.S.R. has been able to concentrate more effort than we have on selected portions of weapons technology and to gain superiority in many phases of military technology driven by strategy. In their designs the Soviets make simplicity an important criterion for both production and operation. Success in achieving simplicity leads to low costs of production and, importantly, to high reliability of operation. Simplicity also allows them to operate the systems with personnel who have only rudimentary training and skills, and to reserve their limited supply of highly skilled technicians for research and development. Because their deadlines are self-imposed, the Soviets can take their time about selecting designs. This was the pattern they followed in military computer technology. After making a survey of Western advances on a variety of fronts, they chose an optimum path to follow. [ Pobierz caÅ‚ość w formacie PDF ] |